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Litigation under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: 
Opportunities to support and supplement the climate change regime
James Harrison1 
I. Introduction
It is now widely accepted that climate change is one of the most important challenges facing
the international community and it demands ‘urgent action’2 to mitigate the significant risks
posed to humankind and natural ecosystems. The international regime has evolved to demand
that all states undertake ‘ambitious efforts’ to combat climate change with a view to holding
the increase in the global average temperature to ‘well below 2oC above pre-industrial levels’
and to  increasing  the  ability  of  the  all  states  to  adapt  to  the  adverse  impacts  of  climate
change.3  
The  importance  of  the  oceans  in  the  climate  change  regime  has  also  gradually  been
acknowledged, with the Intergovernmental  Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) publishing a
report  in September 2019, which recognises the significant  effects  that  climate  change is
having on the world’s seas. The IPCC records the unabated warming of the oceans since 1970
and highlights that the oceans are thought to have taken up more than 90% of the excess heat
in the climate system.4  The melting of glaciers into the oceans has also affected the salinity
of marine waters.5 These events have had significant repercussions for marine ecosystems.
Certain habitat types have been devastated by warming waters, with widespread evidence of
tropical coral reefs being particularly badly hit. An outlook report on the Great Barrier Reef
released in August 2019 officially  classified the status of the reef as very poor,  with sea
temperature increases caused by climate change being a major driver of its decline.6 A further
mass coral bleaching event, caused by increased sea temperatures, was recorded in February
2020.7 Nor is the Great Barrier Reef alone in being affected; according to a 2016 report, ‘by
the end of 2015, 32% of coral reefs worldwide had been exposed to thermal stress of 4 °C-
weeks or more and almost all of the world’s reefs had exceeded their normal warm-season
temperatures.’8 Yet, the consequences of climate change go far beyond coral reefs, with many
marine species shifting their geographical range and seasonal activities in response to ocean
warming,  changes  in  biogeochemical  conditions,  and  loss  of  habitat.9 Whilst  the  precise
impacts vary from region to region, these changes have implications for the whole planet,
1 Professor of Environmental Law, University of Edinburgh. Email: james.harrison@ed.ac.uk.
2 UNGA Resolution 70/1, Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 21 October
2015, Goal 13.
3  Paris Agreement (concluded 12 December 2015, entered into force 4 November 2016) Article 2.  
4 IPPC, The Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate: Summary for Policy Makers  (24 September 2019)
para A2.
5 Ibid, para A6.
6 Great Barrier Reef Authority, Great Barrier Reef Outlook Report 2019 (2019).
7 See <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-australia-52043554  >   accessed 30 April 2020.
8 C Mark Eakin et al, ‘Global Coral Bleaching 2014-2017: Status and Appeal for Observations’ (2016)  Reef
Encounter: The News Journal of the International Society of Reef Studies 20, 23.
9 IPPC  (n  4)  para  A5.  For  a  study  of  distributional  shifts  in  fish  stocks  in  the  North-East  Atlantic,  see
International Council for the Exploration of the Seas, Report of the Working Group on Fish Distribution Shifts
(2017).
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because of the vital  ecosystem services provided by the oceans at the local,  regional and
global levels.10
In addition to the direct impacts of climate change, the ocean has also undergone significant
acidification through the absorption of carbon dioxide (CO2) into the water column.11 The
primary casualties of ocean acidification are those marine species who rely upon calcification
to  form  their  physical  structures  –  eg  corals  and  crustaceans  –  but  emerging  scientific
research  suggests  that  there  may be broader  impacts  on the behaviour  of  marine  species
because of the way that acidification alters the cycling of nutrients, elements and compounds
in the water column.12  
The  only  way of  tackling  the  climate  change  impacts  on  the  oceans  in  the  long-term is
through the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (eg CO2, methane, nitrous oxide)
into the atmosphere, although impacts may be reduced through adaptation measures, which
increase the resilience of marine ecosystems in the short-term. The oceans may also provide
some solutions to climate change, through the opportunities to store captured carbon dioxide
in sub-sea geological formations or through the use of geo-engineering techniques, although
these technological innovations must be approached with care in order to ensure that they do
not cause other types of harm to marine ecosystems.13
Perhaps surprisingly, the oceans have not featured prominently in discussions on mitigation
and  adaptation  under  the  United  Nations  Framework  Convention  on  Climate  Change
(UNFCCC) until very recently. The ‘Because the Ocean Initiative’ was launched at the 21 st
Conference of the Parties (COP) in 2015 as a means to raise awareness of the interlinkages
between the climate change regime and the oceans with a view to ‘enhanc[ing] global ocean
resilience  to  the impacts  of  CO2  emissions  and climate  change.’14 Momentum has grown
through  a  number  of  formal  and  informal  initiatives.15 The  25th COP held  in  Madrid  in
December  2019  was  heralded  by  the  organisers  as  a  ‘blue  COP’,  although  the  final
conference  decisions  do little  more than initiate  yet another  ‘dialogue on the oceans  and
climate  change  to  consider  how  to  strengthen  mitigation  and  adaptation  action  in  this
context.’16 Indeed,  the  climate  regime  is  a  long  way  from  producing  the  commitments
necessary  to  meet  its  objective;  a  recent  UNEP report  reveals  how current  commitments
would lead to greenhouse gas emissions in 2030 being 38% higher than required to meet the
1.5oC goal.17
It is the slow progress through these political processes which leads to discussions about how
other  legal  frameworks  may  be  able  to  stimulate  action  on  climate  change  and  what
contributions litigation could make. The question to be addressed in this chapter is how the
10 See L Inniss, A Simcock et al, First Global Integrated Marine Assessment (United Nations 2016) chapters 3-
9.
11 IPPC (n 4) para A2.5.
12 Royal Society, Climate Change Evidence and Causes: Update (2020) 17.  See also SJ Hennige, JM Murray,
and P Williamson (eds) An updated synthesis of the impacts of ocean acidification on marine biodiversity (CBD
Technical Series No 75, 2014).
13 See section IV below.
14 First Because the Ocean Declaration (2015): <https://www.becausetheocean.org/> accessed 9 June 2020.
15 See  also  the  Roadmap  to  Oceans  and  Climate  Action  (ROCA)  Initiative:<  https://roca-initiative.com/
>accessed 8 June 2020; The Ocean Pathway: <https://cop23.com.fj/the-ocean-pathway/> accessed 8 June 2020.
16 COP Decision 1/CP.25, Chile Madrid Time for Action, Document FCCC/CP/2019/13/Add.1, 15 December
2019, paras 30-31.
17  See UNEP, Emissions Gap Report 2019, available at <https://www.unenvironment.org/resources/emissions-
gap-report-2019> accessed 30 April 2020.
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law of the sea regime can contribute to tackling climate change and particularly how the
dispute  settlement  system under  the  United  Nations  Convention  on  the  Law  of  the  Sea
(UNCLOS)18 may be used in order to promote action on this front. UNCLOS is an obvious
focus,  not  only because  of  its  widespread acceptance  and its  overarching  framework for
marine  environmental  protection,  but  also  because  it  permits  unilateral  recourse  to
international courts and tribunals for most marine environmental disputes. Section II of the
chapter  will  give  a  brief  background  to  UNCLOS as  the  so-called  ‘constitution  for  the
oceans’19 and  what  options  for  dispute  settlement  it  provides.  Sections  III  and  IV  will
consider which provisions of UNCLOS could be invoked in order to address climate change
mitigation. Section V concludes by reflecting upon additional factors that might influence the
success of a litigation strategy, as well as the limitations on this course of action.
II. UNCLOS Dispute Settlement 
UNCLOS is the central  pillar  of the international  legal framework for the oceans,  laying
down rules on the jurisdictional  framework that  governs the regulation of most  maritime
activities. At the time of writing, UNCLOS had been accepted by 168 parties, including most
coastal and maritime states.20  
The importance of the Convention is not only the rules that it contains, but the inclusion of a
system for the compulsory settlement of most disputes arising thereunder.21 In this respect,
UNCLOS can be contrasted with the major  climate  change treaties,  which make binding
dispute  settlement  optional  and  rely  upon  conciliation  as  the  main  method  of  dispute
settlement.22
Whilst dispute settlement under UNCLOS is generally compulsory, there is no single forum
which is competent to hear disputes. Rather, UNCLOS invites states to nominate one of the
four following dispute settlement forums when they sign, ratify or accede to the Convention: 
 the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea;
 the International Court of Justice;
 an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII; or
 a special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VIII.23  
Disputes  may be  submitted  to  any forum nominated  by both  the  applicant  state  and the
respondent state.24 If the states concerned have not nominated the same forum or if they have
not nominated any forum at all, a dispute can only be submitted to Annex VII arbitration.25 In
practice, only 54 UNCLOS parties have made a declaration indicating their choice of forum,
meaning  that  Annex  VII  arbitration  is  likely  to  be  the  default  forum for  most  disputes,
18 UNCLOS (concluded 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994).
19 See  T  Koh,  ‘A  Constitution  for  the  Oceans’,  available  at
<https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm> accessed 4 June
2020.
20 See<  https://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm> accessed 9 June
2020 
21 UNCLOS (n 18) Part XV.
22 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (concluded 9 May 1992, entered
into force 21 March 1994) Article 14; Paris Agreement (n3) Article 24.
23 UNCLOS (n 18) Article 287(1).
24 Ibid, Article 287(4).
25 Ibid, Article 287(3) and (5).
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although it is open to the parties to agree upon an alternative forum26 or even to transfer
proceedings to a different forum once Annex VII arbitration has commenced.27  
Whichever forum is chosen to hear a dispute, the scope of jurisdiction is prescribed by Article
288,  which  limits  an  UNCLOS  court  or  tribunal  to  deciding  ‘disputes  concerning  the
interpretation or application of this Convention which is submitted to it in accordance with
this Part.’28 Courts and tribunals have emphasised that this limitation means that they do ‘not
have  jurisdiction  to  determine  breaches  of  obligations  not  having  their  source  in  the
Convention’29,  but it has also been recognised that courts and tribunals may ‘rely on primary
rules of international law other than the Convention in order to interpret and apply particular
provisions  of  the  Convention.’30 Such  systemic  interpretation  has  been  particularly
emphasised in disputes concerning Part XII on the Protection and Preservation of the Marine
Environment; the Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration made clear that the content of
Part XII was ‘informed by […] other applicable rules of international law.’31  
The  need  for  the  systemic  interpretation  of  Part  XII  offers  many  opportunities  for
understanding UNCLOS in light  of the broader  international  legal  framework on climate
change, which will be explored in the following sections. However, the potential overlap of
the  two  independent  legal  regimes  also  raises  questions  about  states’  ability  to  pursue
litigation under UNCLOS. In the Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration, the tribunal ruled that it
did not have jurisdiction over a dispute impinging upon both UNCLOS and the Convention
on  the  Conservation  on  Southern  Bluefin  Tuna  because  the  latter  instrument  implicitly
excluded  the  possibility  of  compulsory  arbitration.32 Yet,  this  decision  has  proven
controversial33 and the tribunal in the  South China Sea Arbitration took the view that even
though it  is  ‘true that  the same facts  may implicate  multiple  treaties’34,  ‘a  dispute under
UNCLOS does not become a dispute under [another treaty] merely because there is some
overlap between the two.’35 This latter  view is more convincing and it  opens the door to
pursuing  litigation  on  climate  change  under  UNCLOS,  despite  a  parallelism  of  treaty
regimes.36 This  leads  us  to  questions  about  what  potential  claims  may  be  made  under
UNCLOS.
III. Invoking UNCLOS to support action under the climate change regime 
UNCLOS was negotiated at a time when climate change had not yet been acknowledged as a
major threat by the international community and therefore it is no surprise that it does not
expressly mention climate change.  Nevertheless,  Part  XII of UNCLOS was drafted to be
26 Ibid, Article 287(4).
27 See eg M/V Saiga (No 2), ITLOS Case No 2, Order, 20 February 1998; M/T San Pedro Pio, ITLOS Case No
27, Order, 7 January 2020.
28 UNCLOS (n 18) Article 288(1).
29 Duzgit Integrity, PCA Case No 2014-07, Award, 5 September 2016, para 207.
30 Ibid, para 208.
31 South China Sea Arbitration (Merits), PCA Case No 2013-19, Award, 12 July 2016, para 941.
32 Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), Award, 4 August 2000.
33 See e.g. J Peel, ‘A Paper Umbrella which Dissolves in the Rain? The Future for Resolving Fisheries Disputes
under UNCLOS in the Aftermath of the Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration’ (2002) 3 MJIL 53; 
34 South China Sea Arbitration (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), PCA Case No 2013-19, Award, 29 October
2015, para 284.
35 Ibid, para 285.
36 See further AE Boyle, ‘Litigating Climate Change under Part XII of the LOSC’ (2019) 34 IJMCL 458, 475-
477.
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flexible and to accommodate emerging threats to the marine environment.37 To this end, the
obligation to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment applies to ‘all
sources’38 and the definition of pollution is broad, covering ‘the introduction by man, directly
or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine environment, including estuaries, which
results or is likely to result in […] deleterious effects [...]’39  It is plain that the impact of
climate change on the oceans falls within this definition, particularly by the introduction of
heat, a source of energy, into the oceans.40  
Of  course,  the  obligation  in  UNCLOS  is  not  to  prevent  all  pollution  of  the  marine
environment, but rather it is an obligation of due diligence41, meaning that states must take
appropriate  action  to  prevent  foreseeable  marine  environmental  harm.  Due  diligence
obligations are by their very nature flexible and they must be interpreted on a case-by-case
basis, taking into account, inter alia, the nature of the threats posed by a particular source of
pollution and the capacities of an individual country to address those threats.42 Due diligence
must also now be understood as demanding a precautionary approach, meaning that it is not
necessary to prove with absolute certainty the likelihood of harm, as the obligation to act will
be triggered when there are ‘plausible indications of potential risks.’43 As recently held by the
Dutch Supreme Court in the Urgenda litigation, ‘the precautionary principle therefore means
that more far-reaching measures should be taken to reduce [GHG] emissions, rather than less-
far reaching measures.’44 Due diligence is also a dynamic concept so that the content of the
obligation  ‘change[s]  over  time  as  measures  considered  sufficiently  diligent  at  a  certain
moment  may  become  not  diligent  enough  in  light,  for  instance,  of  new  scientific  or
technological knowledge.’45  
An important factor to be taken into account when deciding what action is required as a
matter  of  due diligence  is  the existence  of  any applicable  international  legal  obligations.
When it comes to adopting national measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the
marine environment from land-based activities or from or through the atmosphere, UNCLOS
expressly requires states to take into account any ‘internationally agreed rules, standards, and
recommended practices and procedures.’46   
Despite the weak language of this rule of reference, when states are bound by those other
international  rules,  it  can be argued that  states  are  obliged to  apply them as  a  minimum
standard for action under UNCLOS.47 Thus, when the Kyoto Protocol was the principal legal
instrument regulating the emissions of developed economies, it was relatively straightforward
37 J Harrison, Saving the Oceans through Law (OUP 2017) 27; C Redgwell, ‘Treaty Evolution, Adaptation and
Change: Is the LOSC “Enough” to Address Climate Change Impacts on the Marine Environment?’ (2019) 34
IJMCL 440-457.
38 UNCLOS (n 18) Article 194(3).  
39 UNCLOS (n 18) Article 1(1)
40 Harrison (n 37) 255; Boyle (n 36) 462; T Stephens, ‘Warming Waters and Souring Seas’, in D Rothwell et al
(eds), Oxford Handbook on the Law of the Sea (OUP 2015) 783.
41 South China Sea Arbitration (Merits) (n 31) para 944.
42 See Harrison (n 37) 28-29.
43 Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the
Area, ITLOS Case No 17, Advisory Opinion, 1 February 2011, para 131.
44 The State of the Netherlands v Stichting Urgenda, Case No 19/00135, Judgment, 20 December 2019, para
7.2.10. See also the Chapter on Climate Change Litigation in The Netherlands by C Bakker in this volume.
45 Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the
Area (n 43) para. 117.
46 UNCLOS (n 18) Articles 207(1) and 212(1).
47 Boyle (n 36) 468.
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to argue that the targets agreed by states in that instrument provided a benchmark against
which to judge the action of states to combat climate change under Part XII of UNCLOS.
Indeed, given that the targets under the Kyoto Protocol were part of a multilateral agreement,
Boyle convincingly argued that ‘it seems very likely that any tribunal would […] be reluctant
to require more of States than they have agreed to under Kyoto [...].’48  Moreover, linking
implementation of UNCLOS commitments on the protection of the marine environment to
the Kyoto Protocol was only possible for those parties having binding commitments under
the latter instrument, which did not cover certain major emitters, such as the United States of
America or China.
A slightly different line of argumentation is required for the targets adopted for the second
implementation period of the Kyoto Protocol under the Doha amendment. This amendment
lays down individual quantitative reduction targets for a number of industrialised states for
the period 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2020. Given that this amendment has not entered
into force and no states have formally agreed to provisionally apply it, states are not obliged
to meet this standard in the same way as they were obliged to meet their commitments for the
first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol. Despite the fact that they are not legally
binding, the targets in the Doha amendment can arguably be still counted as ‘international
rules  and  standards’  or  (more  likely)  ‘recommended  practices  and  procedures’  for  the
purposes of Articles 207 and 212 of UNCLOS, meaning that they at least have to be ‘taken
into account’ when deciding what action is required under these provisions. In this context, it
is worth noting that the decision adopting the amendments reinforces that the amendments do
not rely exclusively on their entry into force for their normative value; the decision says that
parties ‘will implement their commitments and other responsibilities in relation to the second
commitment  period,  in  a  manner  consistent  with  their  national  legislation  or  domestic
processes, as of 1 January 2013 and pending the entry into force of the amendment.’49 Yet,
neither this  decision,  nor the rule of reference in UNCLOS, demand absolute compliance
with  the  Doha amendment,  as  they  both  clearly  give  some flexibility  to  take  alternative
measures.  Nevertheless, the fact that the Doha amendment was multilaterally agreed means
that  it  provides strong evidence of what is required by due diligence.  A state  wishing to
unilaterally depart from this target would have to provide a clear justification for its position
in order to convince a court or tribunal that the target agreed by the international community
should be lowered. Indeed, it is important to observe that the targets included in the Doha
amendment are envisaged as a minimum and states are encouraged to unilaterally ‘revisit’ its
target and ‘increase the ambition of its commitment.’50 In this respect, the Doha targets can be
contrasted with the original targets in the Kyoto Protocol and it is therefore possible to argue
that states may need to go above and beyond the levels set out in the Doha amendment in
order to meet their due diligence obligation under UNCLOS. Of course, in this context, the
claimant  state  would  have  to  convince  a  court  or  tribunal  that  the  multilaterally  agreed
standard was insufficient  to  meet  the due diligence  obligation  in UNCLOS. The greatest
drawback  of  interpreting  UNCLOS  in  light  of  the  Doha  amendment  is  that  several
industrialised countries opted out – namely Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the Russian
Federation51 – and so it only covers a minority of global emissions52, limiting its usefulness as
a benchmark for due diligence.  
48 AE Boyle, ‘Law of the Sea Perspectives on Climate Change’ (2012) 27 IJMCL 831, 836.
49 COP Decision 1/CMP.8, para 6.
50 Ibid, para 7.
51 See ibid, footnotes 13-16.
52 See  B  Mayer,  The  Curious  Fate  of  the  Doha  Amendment,  EJIL  Talk!,  4  May  2020,  available  at<
ejiltalk.org/the-curious-fate-of-the-doha-amendmen/> accessed 9 June 2020.
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What about climate change action in the post-2020 period? Under the Paris Agreement, the
rigid  differentiation  between  industrialised  countries  and  developing  countries  has  been
dropped  and  all  states  are  now  expected  to  take  mitigation  action,  even  if  developed
economies should still take the lead.53 This potentially increases the opportunities for climate
change litigation linked to the climate change regime. At the same time, the Paris Agreement
introduces a fundamental shift in the international community’s response to climate change,
by moving from a top-down regime of targets and timetables to a bottom-up system of pledge
and  review.54 Thus,  states  are  to  set  their  own  targets  through  so-called  Nationally
Determined  Contributions  (NDCs).55 These  documents  are  far  more  complex  than  the
commitments  under  the  Kyoto  Protocol  or  the  Doha  amendment.  Whereas  the  Paris
Agreement itself provides few details about the content of NDCs and the final ‘rules’ on the
communication  of  NDCs  have  not  yet  been  adopted,  it  would  appear  that  states  have
significant flexibility for determining their approach56, as is demonstrated by the variety in
NDCs that have been communicated to date. For example,  some countries have indicated
quantified  emissions  reduction  targets57 whereas  other  countries  have indicated  emissions
limit targets58 or maximum growth rates.59  In contrast, some NDCs have indicated a target
range  for  reductions,  rather  than  a  precise  target60 or  they  have  distinguished  between
‘binding  targets’  and  ‘indicative  targets’61 or  ‘unconditional’  and  ‘conditional’
contributions.62 Some NDCs also outline the detailed measures that the state intends to take in
order to achieve the target.63  
As well as substantive differences to previous commitments under the climate change regime,
the  unilateral  NDCs  also  have  a  different  legal  character  from the  obligations  of  result
embedded in the Kyoto Protocol and the Doha amendments. The key obligation in the Paris
Agreement  requires  that  each  party  ‘prepares,  communicates  and  maintains  successive
nationally determined contributions that it  intends to achieve’ and it further provides that
‘parties shall pursue domestic mitigation measures, with the aims of achieving the objectives
of such contributions.’64 Most commentators agree that the Paris Agreement establishes an
obligation of conduct for states to take appropriate measures to achieve their NDCs.65 In other
words,  states  are  not  legally  bound to  achieve  any target  in  their  NDC, as  long as  they
exercise their best efforts to do so. Furthermore, the description of specific measures within
an NDC does not commit a state to taking those particular measures, as they are not part of
the objective of the NDC.  
53 Paris Agreement (n 3) Article 4(4).
54 For further discussion, see A Savaresi, ‘The Paris Agreement and the Future of the Climate Regime’, in G
Ulrich et al (eds), How International Law works in Times of Crisis (OUP 2019) 189-205.
55 Paris Agreement (n 3) Article 3.
56 See eg COP Decision 1/CP.21, para 27.
57 Eg Switzerland NDC (18 February 2020): 50 percent by 2030 compared to 1990 levels; New Zealand NDC
(22 April 2020): zero net emissions of greenhouse gases (other than biogenic methane) by 2050; Japan NDC (31
March 2020): 26.0% reduction by FY 2030 compared to FY 2013.
58 Eg Singapore NDC (30 March 2020): an economy-wide absolute GHG emissions limitation target to peak its
GHG emissions at 65 MtCO2e around 2030.
59 Eg Oman NDC (21 May 2019). 
60 Eg Kyrgyzstan NDC (17 February 2020): reduce GHG emissions in the range of 11.49 - 13.75% below
business as usual in 2030 and in the range of 12.67 - 15.69% below business as usual in 2050.
61 Eg Marshall Islands NDC (21 November 2018).
62 Eg Rwanda NDC (5 October 2016).
63 Eg Uzbekistan NDC (8 November 2018); Canada NDC (10 May 2017).
64 Paris Agreement (n 3) Article 3(2).
65 Savaresi (n 56) 201; Mayer (n 54); C Voigt, ‘The Paris Agreement:  What is the standard of conduct for
parties? (2016) 26 Questions of International Law 17-28.
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Based upon the preceding analysis, it is not possible to argue that NDCs provide a definitive
statement  of  what  states  must  do  in  order  to  meet  their  due  diligence  obligations  under
UNCLOS.  If  states  can  justify  a  failure  to  reach  their  stated  targets  under  the  Paris
Agreement,  then  such  justifications  will  also  be  relevant  to  deciding  whether  they  have
complied with their UNCLOS obligations. Nevertheless, the NDC can still be used as strong
evidence of what  action may be appropriate  to tackle climate change for the purposes of
UNCLOS.  After  all,  NDCs  represent  a  statement  of  what  that  state  considers  to  be  an
appropriate contribution to the global mitigation objective at a particular point in time. Such
statements must be presumed to have been made in good faith and therefore they can be
considered to constitute prima facie evidence of an appropriate standard for due diligence.
Nevertheless, it is open to states to produce evidence as to why they have failed to meet the
objectives in their NDC or as to why their NDC is not an appropriate standard. Yet, the value
of  litigation  in  this  context  is  precisely  the  opportunity  to  engage  with  a  state  on  these
questions in a judicial forum with clear standards and procedures for presenting evidence and
an independent arbiter to decide the issue in an authoritative manner.  
Nor is UNCLOS litigation necessarily restricted to promoting compliance by a state with its
own NDC.  It may also be possible to argue that a NDC does not go far enough in order to
meet  the  autonomous  due  diligence  standard  under  UNCLOS.  Unlike  the  multilateral
character of the commitments under Kyoto, NDCs lack the endorsement of other states and
therefore they cannot be considered as a definitive understanding of what is demanded by due
diligence in the context of climate change. Indeed, the Paris Agreement itself indicates that
individual NDCs must be adapted over time, with successive NDCs gradually increasing the
level of ambition.66 The relatively frequent timetable for reappraisal of NDCs as well as the
regular  progress  reports  required  by  the  Agreement67 provide  valuable  opportunities  to
consider whether states have done enough to develop their climate change mitigation plans,
with the possibility of legal action under UNCLOS if there is a lack of action or a failure to
demonstrate ambition. For example, it  has been argued that ‘a comparison could be made
with the best performers in a similar situation’68 and, in this respect, the public registry of
NDCs69 provides a valuable source of contextual information in order to compare the action
of a single state against its peers in order to demonstrate a tardiness or lethargy in climate
action. It must be stressed that, in this case, an UNCLOS court or tribunal is not being called
upon to decide precisely what action is required by a particular state, but rather whether or
not  a  state  has  done enough to meet  its  due diligence  obligation.  We will  return to  this
important distinction in the conclusion.
IV. Invoking UNCLOS to supplement action under the climate change regime 
One  criticism  of  the  climate  change  regime  has  been  its  exclusive  focus  on  reducing
emissions,  without  consideration  of  other  issues.  In  this  section,  we  will  consider  how
litigation under UNCLOS could be used to ensure that  states take broader environmental
issues into account when developing their climate change policies. 
The  first  major  omission  from  the  climate  change  regime  is  its  failure  to  expressly
acknowledge the problem of ocean acidification, despite the fact that it is caused by one of
66 Paris Agreement (n3) Article 4(3).
67 Ibid, Article 13.
68 Boyle (n36) 474.
69 <https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/Pages/Home.aspx> accessed 9 June 2020.
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the principal GHGs also responsible for climate change, namely CO2.70 By itself, the climate
change regime does not require action against ocean acidification, as CO2 is only one of the
bundle of GHGs that may be regulated by states in order to meet their commitments under the
Paris Agreement. There may even be an incentive to focus GHG reductions on other gases,
such as methane, 1kg of which is equivalent to 25kg of CO2.  In extremis, Stephens observes
that  ‘states  […]  may  even  increase  CO2 emissions,  so  long  as  there  is  a  corresponding
reduction  in  other  GHGs.’71 Indeed,  despite  the  growing  awareness  of  this  issue,  ocean
acidification  continues  to  be  treated  as  a  low  priority.  Very  few  states  have  explicitly
addressed  this  issue  in  their  NDCs.72 Oral  rightly  points  out  that  collective  action  will
ultimately be needed and she argues that ‘the UNFCCC regime appears to provide the more
suitable  framework  for  the  collective  action  necessary  to  mitigate  emissions  of  carbon
dioxide  causing  ocean  acidification.’73 The  question  to  be  addressed  here  is  what  role
litigation may play as a spur for such action. 
Whilst  ocean  acidification  is  not  mentioned  by  UNCLOS,  there  is  little  doubt  that  the
absorption of CO2 by the oceans qualifies as marine pollution under UNCLOS and therefore
states are under a due diligence obligation to take appropriate action.74 It follows that a state
which chooses to predominantly concentrate its GHG emission reductions on other gases,
whilst not addressing its CO2 emissions, may not be compliant with its UNCLOS obligations,
even if it was not in breach of the Paris Agreement.75 It is obviously difficult to pinpoint a
particular  level  of  CO2  reductions  that  might  be required  from an individual  state  in  the
absence of any globally agreed targets  or unilateral  commitments.  Nevertheless,  it  is still
possible to argue that in order to satisfy their due diligence obligation, states must be able to
demonstrate that they have considered their contribution to ocean acidification and they have
reflected  this  element  in  their  overall  emissions  reductions  policies  in  a  precautionary
manner.  In other words, UNCLOS requires at a minimum that states can demonstrate that
they have quantified their  contribution to ocean acidification and they have adopted what
they  consider  to  be  appropriate  measures  to  mitigate  any  damage.  Without  even
acknowledging their contribution, states cannot be considered to be acting diligently.
UNCLOS may play a similar role in ensuring that measures taken to combat climate change
do not have a detrimental impact on marine ecosystems. It is broadly accepted that so-called
negative emissions reduction technologies may need to used to meet the global temperature
targets under the Paris Agreement76, with marine carbon capture and storage77 and marine
geo-engineering having both been highlighted as being particularly promising in this respect.
Yet,  states must take into account the potential  impacts  of these strategies on the marine
environment.  It has been recognised for some time that efforts to address climate change
70 See eg ER Harrould-Kolieb, ‘Ocean Acidification and the UNFCCC: Finding Legal Clarity in the Twilight
Zone’ (2016) 6 WJELP 612.
71 T Stephens, ‘Warming Waters and Souring Seas’, in D Rothwell et al (eds), Oxford Handbook on the Law of
the Sea (OUP 2015) 786.
72 See T Stephens, ‘The Role and Relevance of Nationally Determined Contributions under the Paris Agreement
to Ocean and Coastal Management in the Anthropocene’ (2018) 33 Ocean Yearbook 250, 263.
73 N Oral, ’Ocean Acidification: Falling between the Legal Cracks of UNCLOS and the UNFCCC’ (2018) 45
ELQ 9, 29.
74 See Harrison (n 37) 257; KN Scott, ‘Ocean Acidification: A due diligence obligation under the LOSC’ (2020)
35 IJMCL 382, 393.
75 See ibid, 402.
76 Eg RS Haszeldine et al, ‘Negative emissions technologies and carbon capture and storage to achieve the Paris
Agreement commitments’ (2018) A376 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 20160447.
77 See eg IPCC, Special Report on Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (2005).  Carbon capture and storage is
already a key element of some states’ NDCs; see e.g. Saudi Arabia NDC; Norway NDC.
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could end up having negative effects on biodiversity, if not carried out sensitively.78 A recent
study by the  Joint  Group of  Experts  on the  Scientific  Aspects  of  Marine Environmental
Protection (GESAMP) indicated that significant gaps in scientific knowledge exist in relation
to marine geo-engineering79 and, as noted by Scott, ‘to the extent that they involve increasing
ocean reservoir of CO2, deliberately through fertilisation or naturally through a focus on solar
radiation management rather than emissions control, geo-engineering is likely to make ocean
acidification much worse.’80 Even the relatively less controversial option of sequestering CO2
in sub-sea geological formations could have negative marine environmental impacts if certain
precautions are not taken to, inter alia, prevent leakage of stored CO2. The preamble of the
Paris  Agreement  does  expressly  mention  the  ‘importance  of  ensuring  the  integrity  of  all
ecosystems, including oceans, and the protection of biodiversity […] when taking action to
address climate change’, but it contains no substantive obligations on this subject.  It is in this
respect  that  UNCLOS  may  provide  some  basic  rules  that  regulate  the  use  of  these
technologies  in  order  to  ensure  that  climate  change  mitigation  is  sensitive  to  protecting
marine ecosystems. 
In the first place, Article 196(1) provides that ‘states shall take all measures necessary to
prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment resulting from the use of
technologies  under  their  jurisdiction  or  control’  and Article  195 reiterates  that  ‘in  taking
measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment, States shall act
so as not to transfer, directly or indirectly, damage or hazards from one area to another or
transform one  type  of  pollution  into  another.’  Moreover,  any activity  which  states  have
reasonable  grounds  for  believing  may  cause  substantial  pollution  of  or  a  significant  and
harmful changes to the marine environment’ must be subjected to an environmental impact
assessment (EIA).81 This important procedural tool must be applied, whether or not there is a
transboundary impact from the proposed activity.82 The purpose of an EIA is to ensure that
states have sufficient information in order to inform their decision-making process and to
take  appropriate  mitigation  measures  in  accordance  with  their  overarching  due  diligence
obligation to protect the marine environment.  
These  general  provisions  must  be read  in  light  of  the  UNCLOS provisions  on dumping,
which require parties to adopt laws and regulations ‘no less effective in preventing, reducing
and controlling such pollution than the global rules and standards.’83 This rule of reference is
generally understood to incorporate the relevant provisions of the 1972 London Dumping
Convention84 and the parties to the latter treaty have adopted a number of decisions relating to
both carbon capture and storage and geo-engineering, which may be used to further guide
decision-making by parties to UNCLOS.  
78 See eg TWR Powell and TM Lenton, ‘Scenarios for future biodiversity loss due to multiple drivers reveal
conflict  between  mitigating  climate  change  and  preserving  biodiversity’  (2013)  8  Environmental  Research
Letters 025024. See also Convention on Biological  Diversity COP Decision 14/5,  Biodiversity and Climate
Change (2018).
79 GESAMP, High Level Review of a Wide Range of Proposed Marine Geoengineering Techniques (GESAMP
Reports and Studies No 98, 2019).
80 KN Scott, ‘Engineering the ‘Mis-Anthropocene’: International Law, Ethics and Geoengineering’ (2018) 29
Ocean Yearbook 61, 68-69.
81 UNCLOS (n 18) Article 206.
82 Harrison (n 37) 32.
83 UNCLOS (n 18) Article 210(6).
84 See Harrison (n 37) 100.
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Firstly, in 2012, the parties to the London Dumping Convention adopted specific guidelines
for the assessment of CO2 for disposal into sub-seabed geological formations.85 This guidance
is intended to ensure that  states  take an appropriate  range of considerations  into account
before authorising the storage of CO2 in sub-sea geological formations, including the risks of
leakage.   The guidance makes it clear that storage of CO2  should only take place in sub-
seabed geological formations and dumping of CO2  in the water column is never appropriate,
as  it  is  likely  to  cause  further  ocean  acidification.86 Whilst  non-binding,  states  can
demonstrate that they have met their due diligence obligations under UNCLOS if they can
show that they have followed this internationally agreed guidance. In contrast, failure to do so
may raise questions about the propriety of their action.
Secondly,  the  parties  to  the  London  Dumping  Convention  have  also  adopted  relevant
decisions  relating  to  geo-engineering,  including  a  2008  decision  that  ‘ocean  fertilization
activities  other  than  legitimate  scientific  research  should  not  be  allowed’  and that   such
activities ‘should be considered as contrary to the aims of the Convention and Protocol and
not  currently  qualify  for  any  exemption  from  the  definition  of  dumping  in  […]  the
Convention  [...].’87 This  is  an important  interpretation  of  the  dumping treaties  because it
brings geo-engineering within their scope and this interpretation could also be applied to the
definition of dumping for the purposes of UNCLOS.88 The parties to the dumping treaties
have  also  adopted  an  assessment  framework  for  scientific  research  involving  ocean
fertilisation,  which  provides  guidance  to  states  on  how  to  ensure  that  such  research  is
conducted in such a manner that any risks to the marine environment are minimised.89 The
assessment  framework requires  an  impact  assessment  of  any proposal  and urges  ‘utmost
caution’ to be exercised when authorising scientific research into ocean fertilisation.90 Like
the guidance in relation to CO2 storage, this instrument sets an appropriate benchmark against
which to determine the due diligence of a state in regulating geo-engineering.
V. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has considered a range of arguments that can be made to interpret and apply
UNCLOS in order to prevent, reduce and control the impacts of climate change on the marine
environment.  In doing so, it  has analysed the interrelationship between UNCLOS and the
climate change regime, but also how UNCLOS may be invoked to ensure that states take
additional considerations into account when taking climate change action.   It is in theory
possible that the provisions discussed in this chapter could be used as a basis for an individual
state  to  claim  for  damages  suffered  as  a  result  of  climate  change or  ocean  acidification
impacts on the oceans, but such an approach would present challenges in terms of proving
causation and attributing damage to a particular state.91 It may be more straightforward to
invoke UNCLOS as a means of arguing that a particular state has failed to take appropriate
climate change action with a view to ensuring that the state concerned takes more ambitious
measures in order to bring itself into compliance with its legal obligations. The fact that the
85 Document LC 34/15, annex 8.
86 See Harrison (n 37) 268; Scott (n 76) 401.
87 Resolution LC-LP.1(2008), para 8.
88 UNCLOS (n 18) Article 1(5).
89 See Resolution LC LP.2(2010).  There may be further questions about what is meant by legitimate scientific
research in this context; see Scott (n 82).
90 Resolution LC LP.2(2010).
91 See Boyle (n 36) 479-480; S Lee and L Bautista, ‘Part XII of [UNCLOS] and the duty to mitigate against
climate change: Making out a claim, causation and related issues’ (2018) 45 ELQ 129, 148-149.
11
marine environmental provisions of UNCLOS can be considered as establishing erga omnes
obligations would further facilitate such a claim.92 Even then, it is clear that the target of
litigation  would  have  to  be  chosen  with  care;  whereas  a  successful  claim  could  send  a
powerful signal to the international community of the need for states to take their climate
change obligations seriously, an unsuccessful outcome could undermine that message.  
The availability of dispute settlement under UNCLOS does not mean that states should rush
into litigation in order to demand climate change action. A long-term political solution to
climate change is clearly preferable and the Paris Agreement provides the most appropriate
framework within which to agree on the necessary collective action, particularly through the
anticipated global stocktake exercise.93 Nevertheless, UNCLOS litigation may be particularly
attractive  in  two  scenarios:  either  if  the  mechanisms  under  the  Paris  Agreement  do  not
produce desired results in terms of increased pledges for GHG reductions or if states do not
take adequate action to meet the commitments made under the Paris Agreement and they fail
to respond to diplomatic pressure to do so.  Furthermore, as noted in Part IV of this chapter,
litigation  may be  an  option  in  order  to  ensure  that  climate  change  mitigation  takes  into
account other potential impacts on the marine environment.
Even if litigation is undertaken, the limits of this strategy must be recognised. Whereas legal
action may force states to account for their conduct before an independent judicial organ, it is
important to be realistic about any outcome. It has been acknowledged that litigation of this
sort  raises  legitimacy  challenges  for  courts  and  tribunals  given  the  range  of  scientific,
political and even moral questions implicated by climate change.94 Most courts or tribunals
are thus likely to limit themselves to finding that a state has not lived up to its due diligence
obligation, whilst leaving it to the individual state to decide how to remedy the breach. In this
respect,  the  Dutch  Supreme  Court  has  recently  warned  that  ‘in  determining  the  State’s
minimum obligations, the courts must observe restraint, especially if rules or agreements are
involved that are not legally binding in themselves. It is therefore only in clear-cut cases that
the courts can rule […] that the State has a legal obligation to take measures.’95  Nor is such a
result uncommon in other international environmental disputes where courts have indicated
that a violation of international law has taken place but it has called for the parties to reach a
settlement on how to remedy the situation.96 Therefore, we cannot expect international courts
and tribunal to specify the steps that states must take to address climate change. Nevertheless,
a legal decision may clarify the legal framework within which governments must exercise
their  decision-making  powers,  by  indicating  the  considerations  that  must  be  taken  into
account and the limits of any discretion. Furthermore, even a judicial decision that a state
must do more may be enough to overcome inertia. This observation does, however, mean that
a successful claim is not necessarily the end of the matter and further diplomatic work will be
required even after a successful claim. As explained by Boyle, ‘an authoritative judgment
may facilitate  a settlement  of some kind,  whether  directly,  or by further  negotiations,  or
simply by legitimising the claims made.’97  
92 Harrison (n 37) 24-25.
93 Paris Agreement (n 3) Article 14(1).
94 See J Peel, ‘Issues in Climate Change Litigation’ (2011) 1 CCLR 15-24.
95 The  State  of  the  Netherlands  v  Stichting  Urgenda  (n44) para  6.6.  UK  courts  have  indicated  a  similar
sentiment; see R (on the application of Plan B) v Secretary of State for Transport [2020] EWCA Civ 214, para
285.
96 Eg Icelandic Fisheries Case (1974) ICJ Rep 3, paras 74-75; Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case (1997) ICJ Rep 7,
paras 140-141.
97 Boyle (n 36) 459.
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Finally,  it  should also  be recognised  that  UNCLOS is  not  a  panacea  for  climate  change
litigation. In particular, not all states are a party to UNCLOS, with notable absences including
Iran, Venezuela, Colombia and the United States of America. Indeed, it is worth noting that
the risk of climate change litigation was one of the factors that was raised by members of the
Senate Foreign Affairs Committee when discussing whether or not the United States should
become a party to UNCLOS.98 UNCLOS litigation is not an option in relation to these states,
even if  they  are  in  theory  bound by rules  of  customary international  law relating  to  the
protection of the marine environment.99  
98 See eg comments of Senator Corker in Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States
Senate, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, Second Session, 23 May, 14 June, and 28 June 2012, 32.
99 They may be bound by more specific marine treaties, however; see eg W.C.G. Burns, ‘A Voice for the Fish?
Climate Change Litigation and Potential Causes of Action for Impacts under the United Nations Fish Stocks
Agreement’ (2008) 11 JIWLP 30-62.
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